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Practical formal methods in railways -
the SafeCap approach
Alexei Iliasov, Ilya Lopatkin, Alexander Romanovsky
Newcastle University, UK
Abstract. This paper presents the SafeCap Platform approach to the
verification of railway safety properties. We discuss how the hierarchy of
formal theories is used to capture the railway domain and interface with
verification tools; we explain the contribution of each individual theory to
the overall task of safety verification and capacity assessment. Finally, we
briefly relate our experience of using two independent verification chains
to validate concrete track layouts and control tables against the SafeCap
safety theories.
1 Introduction
Ensuring and demonstrating railway system dependability is crucial for the way
our society operates. Formal methods have been successfully used in developing
various railway control systems. The best-known examples include the use of
the B Method [1] for designing various metro and suburban lines, and airport
shuttles all over the world [5,6]. The formal methods here are used to trace the
requirements to system models and to ensure and demonstrate the system safety.
Our work builds on this work.
The SafeCap Platform [17] is an integrated modelling environment aimed at
a railway signalling engineer. Its focus is the microscopic analysis of a railway
node (station, marshalling yard, complex junction) with the purpose of inves-
tigation, with the maximum level of detail, the performance of a node under
various service patterns, train types and stability margins. Central to achieving
this goal is an efficient and scalable approach to the verification of operational
safety. Indeed, any change in track layout, train detection circuit boundary and
control rule potentially renders a node unsafe. It is our goal to address the
highly challenging verification problem in such a way that it does not unneces-
sarily distract an engineer from the primary goal of optimization. This means a
push-button approach where no expertise in verification technology is required
and a feedback is presented promptly and in a friendly manner.
We continue with the discussion of principal problems and objectives of rail-
way signalling verification. Within the hierarchy defined by Fokkink and Holling-
shead [20], we focus exclusively on the middle interlocking layer leaving out de-
tails of lower layer of physical equipment functioning and upper layer of railway
logics and exploitation largely out of the view. We identify five kinds of railway
safety verification concerns.
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Fig. 1. A simple junction and an excerpt from its control table.
The first three are the fundamental safety properties that may be reasoned
about at a specification level abstracting away from minute details of physical
track topology and the setting in which the track is laid. The remaining two
require consideration of concrete track geometry, topography, train exploitation
characteristics and prospective service requirements.
A schema must be free from collisions. A collision happens when two trains
occupy the same part of a track. Reasoning about collisions must take into an
account concrete topology, requires an explicit train notion, the definition of
laws of train movement and assumptions about train driver (either human or
automatic) behaviour. Note that if train drivers choose to ignore whatever means
of indication of track occupation states are available to them (e.g., track side
signals) there is nothing preventing two trains from colliding. Hence, the absence
of collisions is ensured by demonstrating the compatibility of specific topology,
signalling and certain driving rules.
The basic safety mechanism is that of route locking and holding. A train
is given permission to enter an area of a railway once there is a continuous
and safe path through this area assigned exclusively to the this train. Such a
path is normally called a route and is delineated by signals - either physical
track-side signals with lamps or conceptual signals displayed to a driver via a
computer screen. Two-aspect signals (red/green or stop/proceed) are positioned
at the maximum braking distance from each other and this defines the smallest
train separation. Three and four aspect signalling allow trains to come closer by
advising drivers on the safe speed and the extent of free track available in front.
In Fig. 1, one route example is route S10 S12 between signals S10 and S12.
This route consists of two train detection circuits: AB and AC. A train detection
circuit is a part of a railway (a sub-graph in an abstract topology) with some
equipment capable of reporting the presence or absence of a train in this part. An
additional circuit AD is also in the dependency of this route playing the role of
an overlap. An overlap is an extra part of track reserved together with a route to
protect a train running slightly past a red signal (when, for instance, rail adhesion
is lower than normal and a driver misjudges the stopping distance); alternatively,
it is an area to automatically engage train brakes should a driver fail to notice
a red signal (this is generally known as an automated train protection (ATP)
system).
When a route is locked, all the movable equipment such as points or level
crossings must be set and detected in a position that would let a train safely
travel on its desired route. They must remain locked in such a state until the
train passage is positively confirmed.
A schema must be free from derailments. A derailment may happen when a
train moves over a point that is not set in any specific direction and thus may
move under a train. To avoid this, a point must be positively confirmed to be
locked before a train may travel over it. In a control table one writes a condition
defining when a point reconfiguration may happen. For the example in Fig. 1
such a rule requires that circuit AD is clear.
Another reason for derailment is driving a train through a curve at an unsafe
speed. As a train goes over a curve, the combination of gravitational, centripetal
and centrifugal forces exerts a rolling force on train carriages and a substantial
lateral force on rails. This effect can be mitigated by track canting although no
single canting is a perfect fit for all train types. Hence, enforcing a safe speed
limit before a train enters a curved track area is an essential safety consideration.
There are several ways of doing this. One is a static speed limit. This can be a
sign board warning a driver (circle with number 30 over circuit AD in Fig. 1)
or an electronic signal sent to an on-board computer. A speed restriction may
be also enforced by signalling: a signal does not switch into a permissive aspect
until a train is detected to occupy some preceding detection circuit for a duration
time. A combination of such time duration and track length gives an upper train
speed limit. Example in Fig. 1 uses this technique for route S12 S24: the control
table mandates that a train travelling over the route occupies AC for at least 15
seconds.
Flank protection Consider the example in Fig. 1 and assume some train (2)
approaching to and stopping at signal S40 (going right to left) while some other
train (1) travels over route S12 S14; also, assume that there is no overlap track
for route S40 S42. Should train 2 fail to stop at the signal it might roll into the
path or hit the side of train 1. Another common scenario is having no signalling
in operation at siding BE, BF, BG. A train approaching from a siding would
be operated on sight or using less restrictive shunting signalling. If the siding
goes up a slope there is an additional danger of carriages rolling freely onto
the main line A B. Avoidance of such situations is generally known as flank
protection. Defining route overlaps (e.g., requiring AD to be clear and point P
set in reverse) would generally provide a sufficient safety margin albeit at a cost
of lower performance and extra signalling equipment. An alternative is to set
points in such a way that any interfering traffic would be diverted away or even
derailed using trap points. In our example, we protect main line route S12 S14 by
setting flanking point T to normal (straight) direction to divert any interfering
traffic coming from the siding.
Physical layout properties. A range of properties pertinent to safety requires
analysis of land topography over which track is build. As one example, it must
be ensured that physical signals have certain minimum sighting distance giving
a sufficient time for a driver to react. Sometimes tracks are so close together
that carriages of a train going through a curve may come into a contact with
carriages of a train located on a parallel track. A signalling engineer must identify
and protect such areas (known as fouling points) via signalling rules. Further
examples include gradients at stopping points (e.g., signals) that may be unsafe
for heavy trains, parts of track susceptible to landslips, derbies on the track due
to nearby trees and overpasses, and so on. An important consideration is the
spacing between signals and speed restriction signs: it must be possible for all
trains to brake within the given limits to meet signal or speed limit restriction.
Signal positioning and speed restriction would be wastefully conservative if one
does not consider a specific properties of traffic, in particular train acceleration
and braking performance.
Quality of service. It is never sufficient to consider the safety aspect of a
railway in isolation from its performance. Indeed, setting all signals permanently
to red (stop) state trivially satisfies all the safety concerns discussed above. As a
less extreme example, there could be a signalling mistake preventing or hindering
train progress but not violating safety properties. Typically, when signalling a
station or a junction, an engineer would have access to a provisional time table.
A time table defines traffic class and station calling and dwelling times. It must
be ensured that signalling is able to accommodate such traffic with some extra
margin for unaccounted or delayed traffic. Simulation of train runs is the common
way to check quality of service requirements.
2 Safety verification
In this section we discuss requirements to verification of railway signalling, in
particular verification of control tables, and characterise major approaches used
in the industry and proposed by academia. We start with the summary of aspects
of verification - the prominent traits we believe to be relevant to industrial
adoption. Our focus is largely on the application of formal verification to railway
signalling.
2.1 Aspects of verification
Rigour A good verification technique is both exhaustive and thorough; this
should be a natural consequence of innate properties of an applied technique
rather than achieved through measures of extra diligence or man power. Clearly,
a truly rigorous techniques must be based on an objective, formal handling
of safety-related artefacts expressed in a mathematical notation. The results
achieved with a rigorous technique must be readily reproducible from the record
of verification activity: a property highly desirable for the certification of sig-
nalling solutions.
Productivity It is not enough to simply offer a rigorous techniques; there must
be means available and accessible to an engineer to apply the technique with
some definite prospect of success within a given lapse of time. It means that a
technique must provide automation for most of the routine activities and allow
an engineer to assess the problem at differing levels of detail. A good presentation
of railway artefacts and verification concerns is also an important issue.
Expertise Signalling engineers are expected to be experts in railway signalling
but are rarely also experts in formal verification. Conversely, formal method ex-
perts are rarely proficient in the signalling domain. Hence, a technique levying
an unlikely blend of expertise - i.e., the knowledge of both formal modelling and
railways - would be costly to apply in practice. Lowering of expertise require-
ments is always welcome as it correlates with the reduction of user involvement
and increase in productivity.
Scalability Safety verification is a pressing issue for truly large and complex
stations and junctions. Small-scale signalling may be confidently executed by an
experienced engineer without need for any advanced modelling and verification
techniques. A large layout, however, is beyond mental capacity of a human being
and has to be processed in a piece-wise manner greatly increasing the chance of
both oversights and overly conservative decisions. Therefore, to be truly useful,
a verification technique must be able to scale to the level of a large station or
an area spanning several stations.
Expressiveness In Section 1 we have presented the main classes of verification
conditions. A perfect verification techniques would address all of them in a sat-
isfactory manner. For this, the notation employed to express verification con-
ditions must be rich and flexible enough to capture verification goals without
undermining legibility and, by extension, productivity. Automation tools must
also be capable of dealing with the complete notation, not just a subset of it.
Feedback Although it is valuable to know whether a control table and layout are
safe, it is even more valuable to obtain an explanation of why a given combination
of a control table and layout are not safe and what steps should be taken to make
it safe. Thus, the value of a verification technique is also determined by the form
and kind of feedback a verification activity presents to an engineer. A feedback
in the terms of logical constructs obtained through a mechanical translation of a
railway model into a formal modelling notation is useless in a real life scenario.
A simple yes or no is not good enough either as it leaves an engineer in the dark
about the likely source of a problem. An ideal feedback would narrowly identify
a responsible part and step an engineer through events and actions leading to a
concrete manifestation of safety violation.
2.2 Techniques
In this section we discuss main approaches to signalling verification. In practice,
several techniques may be combined although this has unclear implications on
the overall rigour.
Manual review Just as compilation of control tables is often a manual process,
verification may also be accomplished via a carefully set up but otherwise man-
ual review procedure. In most cases, to facilitate legibility, control tables are
written in a highly structured tabular form following a common standard, i.e.,
UK Railway Group Standard GK/RT 0202 [15] although historic and regional
peculiarities are not uncommon. One possible arrangement is having one com-
pany to design signalling and a competing company to verify it. The reasoning
is that this way both parties are incentivized to do their best.
Manual review is a slow process with very high requirements to reviewers’
expertise. It does not deliver any objective proof of safety. At the same time, it
does not suffer from any limitations of a formal verification process.
Simulation Railway industry widely employs railway simulation tools. These
range from coarse-grained simulation of a national railway network to a detailed
simulation of various aspects of mechanical performance of specific engines and
carriages in a combination with specific rail and balast types. Verification con-
cerns span from analysis of digital communication protocols connecting trains
and regional control to stressing of tunnels and bridges by passing trains. Simu-
lation is widely applied for time table optimisation and interactive 3D simulation
is sometimes used for driver training. RailSys [14] and OpenTrack [13] are two
of the more well-known simulation suites applied in time table optimisation and
general analysis of signalling performance.
The main attraction of simulation is that it does not require deep under-
standing of railway functioning. Simulation tools present many aspects of rail-
way performance in an intuitive, visual manner helping to quickly obtain the
big picture of overall layout and signalling performance. There is, however, no
guarantee of safety as simulation can only ever consider a tiny proportion of all
scenarios.
Model checking The safety challenge of railways and the fact that collision and
derailment properties may be dealt with within the setting of discrete, inertia-less
train movement makes railway safety verification especially appealing for formal
method practitioners. The principal idea of railway model checking is quite sim-
ple: a model of train movement laws is combined with the definitions of track
topology and signalling rules. A model checking tool attempts to go through all
or many execution scenarios to confirm that unsafe scenarios are ruled out. The
list of modelling notations used in this setting is practically endless. Notable
examples include Coloured Petri nets [4], process algebra CSP [9], a continua-
tion work based on the model-based notation ASM [10], an algebraic language
Maude [8] and the B Method together with ProB model checking tool [12].
Review Simulation Theorem proving Model checking SafeCap
Rigour −− −− ++ + +
Productivity −− ∼ −− + ++
Expertise −− ++ −− + +
Scalability + − ++ −− +
Expressiveness ++ ++ ∼ − −
Feedback + ++ − + ∼
Table 1. Characterisation of major verification techniques and the SafeCap approach.
Almost all model checking approaches allow automatic instantiation of tem-
plate models making application of model checking relatively straightforward for
engineers. Many tools are able to report a sequence of steps leading to a safety
violation. While model checkers are able to analyse many more scenarios than a
simulator this comes at a price of reduced expressiveness (i.e., inability to rea-
son about track geometry) and proof certificate is generally not ultimate: there
could be a false negative when a model is too large and too complex to analyse
exhaustively.
Theorem proving Model checking imposes limitations on the model size and
performs best with a relatively limited logical language. Theorem proving over-
comes these limitations and offers potentially unlimited opportunities for veri-
fying safety with the utmost level of rigour. Theorem proving is not necessarily
an all-manual process: there is a large and successful community developing au-
tomated theorem provers [18]. At the moment, automated prove support is best
in the domain of first order logic and set theory; an attempt at reasoning about
continuous train dynamics is likely to require an intervention by a highly skilled
verification expert - the kind of people mostly found in academia. From our ex-
perience, even reasoning about track geometry is surprisingly difficult as this is
a problem outside of the typical application domain of verification tools. One
success story with theorem proving is the ongoing application of B method in
the railway domain [5]. J.-R. Abrial has published methodological guidelines on
an economical use of basic logic and set theory to reason about railwat safety in
a discrete setting [3].
Theorem proving, even with excellent tool support, requires a high level
of expertise in formal verification and mathematical modelling. The semantic
gap between logic and railway concepts is formidable. This leads to generally
low productivity (but we should notice efforts like the BART tool for automatic
refinement of B models [11]), difficulties in interpreting tool feedback, and posing
verification statements in a manner convincing to a non-expert reviewer.
Summary Table 1 summarizes our assessment of verification techniques. Each
aspect is given a score ranging from −− (very poor) to ∼ (satisfactory) to
++ (excellent). The last column characterises the SafeCap verification approach
discussed in the following sections. The approach, as the table illustrates, offers
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Fig. 2. SafeCap Platform architecture.
tangible advantages over both model checking and theorem proving: it scales
better than model checking, offers good productivity and does not require a
high level of expertise.
3 Safety verification in SafeCap
The purpose of the SafeCap Platform is to enable railway engineers to analyse
complex junctions by experimenting with signalling rules, signalling principles,
track topology, safety limits (e.g., speed limits for points and crossings) while
receiving an on-line feedback from automated verification and analysis tools.
We have build the Platform around Eclipse - a mature and extensible IDE
framework. We used Eclipse Modelling framework (EMF) to realise our Domain
Specific Language (DSL) [7]. One important consideration was the ability to
benefit from the extensive EMF ecosystem which offers a tool-kit for model
manipulation and the construction of graphical and textual editing tools. Apart
from the editing tools, the main components of the Platform are transformation
patterns, model-based animation, simulation and verification (Fig. 2).
The SafeCap platform aims to provide a versatile tool-kit for analysing rail-
way node safety and capacity. The approach we have taken is based on a com-
bination of theorem proving and constraint solving.
We have applied the Event-B modelling notation an its refinement method-
ology to develop a theory of safe railway. This theory explicitly describes train
movements, signal operation and points control. It does not, however, deal with
any specific topology or control table. The proof of safety (we consider absence
of collisions and derailments, and protection of flanks) is done for some class of
topologies and control tables. The proof of Event-B model, although challenging,
is done once and for all.
An important by-product is the set of axiomatic conditions characterising
the class of safe topologies and safe control tables. To establish that a given
track topology and control table are safe we only need to check that they do
not contradict the mentioned axiomatic conditions. We do not need to redo the
proofs of Event-B model. Safety verification is accomplished by putting together
the definition of a concrete topology, control table and the axiomatic conditions
derived by the Event-B model. If a constraint solver does not find a contradiction
in logical statements encoded by this composition then the concrete topology and
control table are deemed safe. Returning to the Event-B domain, the absence of
contradiction established by a constraint solver means that our generic Event-B
model of train behaviour is refined by a model instantiated with the given track
topology and control table.
Schema topology and control table theories come in the form of a list of
first order logic predicates; they do not define any state transitions or dynamic
behaviour but rather well-formedness requirements to objects describing track
topology and control table.
For constraint solving, we make use of two sets of formal notations and tools:
B together with ProB, and Why3. In the short term, we aim to benefit from their
complimentary strengths; in a longer term, the dual verification path provides
a logical redundancy that makes a low-level encoding or tool bug unlikely to be
left undiscovered.
3.1 Discrete driving model
The discrete driving model is an Event-B model capturing train, signal and point
behaviour. It proves that the described behaviour is contained within a certain
safety envelope by formulating and proving, through a number of refinement
steps, safety invariants corresponding to the first three verification objectives of
Section 1. This model gives a formal definition of principal phenomena observed
in railway operation: train movement, route reservation, point locking, route
cancellation and so on.
To construct the proof we have used Event-B [2] and the Rodin Platform
[16]. Train driving rules, like those given in Section 3, are encoded by Event-
B events - atomic state transitions - so that the overall model defines a state
transition system. The safety properties are stated as a system invariant: a subset
of possible states where the dangerous situations may not occur. The proof is
done inductively by examining the effect of each event on a given safety property
and discharging relevant proof obligation (first-order logic theorems).
The model in Fig. 3 illustrates the notation and modelling style of Event-
B. This particular model is the very first (abstract) model in the development
chain.
The overall model is made of seven refinement steps with 470 verification con-
ditions of which 301 were discharged automatically by Rodin theorem provers.
machine route0
sees ctx line
variables
t line // Train/line association
t r hd // Train head position on a line
t r tl // Train tail position on a line
invariant
t line ∈ TRAIN 7→ LINE
// A train is mapped to the id of a route occupied by the head of a train
t r hd ∈ TRAIN 7→ N1
// correspondingly, t r tl(t) is the id of the route occupied by the tail of train t
t r tl ∈ TRAIN 7→ N1
dom(t line) = dom(t r hd)
dom(t line) = dom(t r tl)
// A train occupies a continuous route interval of route from tail till head
∀t·t ∈ dom(t line)⇒ t r tl(t) .. t r hd(t) 6= ∅
The routes a train occupies are the routes defined by the train line
∀t·t ∈ dom(t line)⇒ t r tl(t) .. t r hd(t) ⊆ dom(Line(t line(t)))
// Initially, there are no trains in the system
initialisation
t line, t r hd, t r tl := ∅,∅,∅
events
// A train may appear in the system with this operation
appear =
any t, l where
t ∈ TRAIN \ dom(t line) // a train must be not already in the system
l ∈ LINE
then
t line(t) := lset the train line to l
t r hd(t), t r tl(t) := 1, 1 // set head and tails routes
end
// Moves the head of a train from one route to another
move route hd =
any t where
t ∈ dom(t line)
t r hd(t) < LineLen(t line(t)) // train head must not be on the last line route
then
t r hd(t) := t r hd(t) + 1 // move the head one step forward
end
// Moves the tail of a train between routes
move route tl =
any t where
t ∈ dom(t line)
t r tl(t) < t r hd(t) // a tail must be strictly behind the head of the train
then
t r tl(t) := t r tl(t) + 1 // move the tail one step forward
end
. . .
Fig. 3. An Event-B model of abstract, route-level train movement (an excerpt).
/* (1) */ {} <<: NODE &
/* (2.a) */ {} <<: TRACK &
/* (2.b) */ TRACK <: NODE * NODE &
/* (2.c) */ elm(TRACK) = NODE & /* all nodes are connected by tracks */
...
/* (10) */ AMBIT : LA --> (POW(NODE) * POW(TRACK)) &
/* (11) */ ! (a, q, p) . (a : ran(AMBIT) & a = ( q |-> p ) => p <: q * q & {} <<: p) &
/* (12) */ ! (a, q, p) . (a : ran(AMBIT) & a = ( q |-> p) => p~ <: p) &
/* (13) */ ! (a, q, p) . (a : ran(AMBIT) & a = ( q |-> p) =>
! (n) . (n : q => closure(p)[{n}] = q) ) &
/* (14) */ union({p | # (a, q) . ( a : ran(AMBIT) & q <: NODE &
p <: TRACK & a = ( q |-> p))}) = TRACK &
/* (15) */ ! (a, b, r, s, t, q) . (a : ran(AMBIT) & b : ran(AMBIT) & a /= b &
a = (r |-> s) & b = (t |-> q) => s /\ q = {}) &
...
Fig. 4. Schema well-formedness rules (an excerpt)
3.2 Schema topology theory
The schema topology theory is responsible for verifying logical conditions ex-
pressed over track layout (i.e., track connections, point placement) and logical
topology (i.e., routes and lines as paths through a schema). Few examples of
verification conditions include the connectivity property (no isolated pieces of
track), continuity of routes and lines, absence of cycles, correct traversal of points
and valid placement of train detection circuit boundaries.
We do not expect these conditions to uncover a problem with an existing
track layout for any such a defect would have a profound effect on overall in-
tegrity - something unlikely to be left undiscovered in an operational railway.
However, semi-automated alteration and generation of track layouts (e.g., via
the improvement patterns we are developing in the tool) necessitates a careful
and strict inspection of these basic properties. An automated verification process
ensures high productivity and enables an engineer to explore a large range of
designs within a short time.
Figure 4 gives a sample of verification conditions written in the Classical
B notation [1] and ready to be processed by model checking tool ProB [12].
Not shown is the encoding of DSL elements (track graph, control tables) as sets,
relations and functions of a B model. For a real-life example, such a model may be
6-14 thousand lines long. The same conditions and constructs are also generated
in the Why3 theory notation. It is not a direct translation of the B model and we
intentionally use a differing representation of relations and functions to introduce
a form of modelling diversity. At the moment, for the topology theory, ProB and
Why3 verifications chains deliver broadly similar performance.
3.3 Control table theory
On the platform of the topology verification we define the conditions of op-
erational safety. These are derived, via a formal proof, from a set of discrete
(inertia-less) train movement rules and expressed as a set of constraints over
signalling rules.
...
/* @label (CT.1): A permissive signal may be lit only when all route ambits are clear */
! (l, r). (l |-> r : CT0_DOM => ! (n). (n : 1 .. RASPECT(l, r)-1 =>
routeambits(r) <: CT_CLEAR(l, r, n) )) &
/* @label (CT.2): A route with an overlap may have permissive signal only
when its overlap is reserved and confirmed as clear */
! (l, r). (l |-> r : ROVERLAP & r : dom(LINE(l)) => ! (n). (n : 1 .. RASPECT(l, r)-1 =>
TA[fst(ROUTE(LINE(l)(r)))] <: CT_CLEAR(l, r, n))) &
/* @label (CT.3.a): No point is set both normal and reverse */
! (l, r). (l |-> r : CT0_DOM => CT_NORMAL(l, r) /\ CT_REVERSE(l, r) = {} ) &
...
Fig. 5. Control table conditions (an excerpt)
In SafeCap, we depart from the convention of associating control rules with
track-side signals. Instead, we consider a more general situation where differing
set of signalling rules are applied depending upon the ultimate train destination
or train type and attach control logic to a pair of line and route. This permits, for
instance, to model, on the same track, an express train using two aspect signalling
and a freight train travelling over the same routes but in a three or four aspect
mode. Such an arrangement may be used to achieve an optimal balance between
headway and average speed in a heterogeneous traffic mix. Given the fact that in
UK track-side signals are going to be made obsolete by 2030 [19] this represents
a fairly modest scenario of using virtual signals to improve capacity.
The control table theory demonstrate such properties as the absence of po-
tential collision (as may happen, for instance, when a proceed aspect is given
while a protected part of track is still occupied) and derailment (due to incorrect
point setting or point movement under a train). Other properties relate to the
danger or circular dependencies between signals, dependencies between multi-
aspect signals and operation of auto-signals, conformance with an ATP system,
and verification of point and signal based flank protection. Certain properties,
notably approach speed control via the timed occupation of a track section, are
not verified at this stage as the formalisation at this layer does capture train in-
ertia. Speed limit conformance and other time-related properties are formulated
at the most detailed, fourth layer.
A list of sample control table theory conditions is given in Figure 5. For the
shown rules, the outer quantification selects a pair of a line and a route that
define a list of control rules (one per aspect). This models includes the topology
model1. Constraint solving is the primary verification strategy: we try to detect
a contradiction between concrete data structures defining topology and control
tables and the verification conditions. Again, the model is given in both B and
Why3 notations although this time the Why3 verification route is not successful
for larger examples. In addition, for any mid to large scale schema we currently
have to exclude the verification of flank protection properties as these require
complicated computations over track topology. We are working on a program
that would output a proof term for each instance of flank protection property
1 At the level, it is assumed that the topology theory has been verified and the topology
constraints are turned into axioms
Benchmark Points/Lines/ Conditions, Conditions, Run time, Run time,
Routes topology control table topology control table
Station 1 8/12/14 117 230 4s 2s
Junction 1 23/4/21 280 602 24s 8s
Station 2 6/23/21 104 678 18s 6s
Carlisle, west 24/112/30 350 888 1m 17s 12s
Carlisle 63/161/79 892 1270 6m 4s 19s
Table 2. Verification run times for several sample layouts.
so that a theorem prover or a constraint solver would only have to check the
elementary steps of a prepared proof.
4 Experimental results
We have tested our approach on a range of synthetic and real-life examples.
Whenever possible, we have tried to accurately reproduce layout topology and
control tables from paper-based documents provided by UK’s Network Rail. A
summary of verification experiments is given in Table 2. Control table verifica-
tion scales very well; the solving of topology suffers mainly from the conditions
establishing absence of cycles in the definitions of lines and routes. If these prop-
erties are known to hold (i.e., topology is taken from an existing layout) these
properties may be suppressed.
One of the larger examples we have tackled is the Carlisle Citadel station
with the North, South, and Caldew junctions. The modelled fragment is 2.6km
long and comprises 70 train detection circuits, 63 points, 79 routes and 161 valid
paths. The translation from a scanned PDF drawing and printed control tables
took 45 man-hours. The verification of the topology theory constraints using
ProB took just over 6 minutes on a PC with i7 3730 CPU and utilized just under
2GB of RAM. The Why3 verification of the same theory takes approximately 70
minutes. The control table theory is verified under 20 seconds by ProB and not
verified completely, with the current translation of conditions, using Why3.
The SafeCap Platform is freely available from [17] together with the verifi-
cation models discussed in this paper.
5 Conclusions
In the paper we have surveyed the architecture of the verification infrastructure
of the SafeCap Platform. Our approach has proven to be successful and we are
working with our industrial partners to further improve the fidelity of the models
and the robustness of the verification chain.
One of the advantages of applying formal modelling in the railway domain
is the ability to transfer the modelling expertise accumulated analysing existing
signalling laws to the verification of novel, unexplored ideas. The level of con-
fidence a formal approach brings is especially valuable in overcoming a healthy
scepticism over a novelty in a field known for its conservatism. We plan to extend
our approach to cover moving block, virtual signals and automated train oper-
ation in a uniform and coherent manner. We hope this will allow us to reason
about hybrid solutions combing elements of fixed and moving block principles,
human driving and fully automated operation. As one example, we would like
to model how several similar trains travelling through a junction may be tem-
porarily signalled using the train convoy principle where train separation control
may realised on a more relaxed assumption leading to smaller headway and less
capacity consumption.
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